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This article presents a detailed review and analysis of the discussions around the newmarket mechanism
(NMM) and explores its potential in China. It contributes to the current discussion of the NMM in three
aspects. First, this article attempts to streamline ideas about the NMM. The term NMM is considered to
be an umbrella concept for emission trading systems which all Parties can engage in on a voluntary basis
in the implementation of their intended nationally determined contributions, and which need to satisfy
three criteria: (i) having a large scale scope; (ii) aiming to facilitate a net emission reduction; (iii) al-
lowing ﬂexibility for the host country. We also present a framework to clarify the NMM. Based on this
framework, major options with a high implementation potential are identiﬁed. Second, we argue that the
national-level operational framework determines the chance of successful implementation of the NMM.
We identify different options based on a literature survey and evaluate themwith respect to effectiveness
and efﬁciency. Third, we choose China, a highly inﬂuential country regarding climate change polices, as a
case to analyze the potential contributions and challenges of the NMM and its implementation at dif-
ferent stages of national development.
& 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The idea of the new market-based mechanism (NMM) emerged
at the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change in Bali in 2007. The discus-
sion on the NMM is a continuation of discussion around so-called
“sectoral approaches” proposed by developed countries in the
hope to scale up developing and emerging countries’ mitigation
contributions. It is also driven by the need to improve existingy of Environment Simulation
onment, Tsinghua University,
ng).project-based mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Me-
chanism (CDM). After four years of discussion, the COP 17 in
Durban agreed to deﬁne a NMM and proposed some broad gui-
dance: the NMM is meant to scale up mitigation activities across
broad segments of the economy; may operate at sectoral and/or
project level; and aims to achieve a net decrease and/or avoidance
of greenhouse gas emissions (UNFCCC, 2012). Since Durban, there
has been hardly any progress on the NMM, which largely results
from the fact that it may not be possible for Parties to give their
ﬁnal decision in advance of more clarity about the Durban Plat-
form for Enhanced Action (ADP) (UNFCCC, 2014a). Notwithstand-
ing, the new agreement of the Paris Climate Change Conference in
2015 established a new international carbon market mechanism
(‘Sustainable Development Mechanism’) and speciﬁed some other
S. Gao et al. / Energy Policy 98 (2016) 221–231222important principles in Article 6 (UNFCCC, 2015a).
There are still many parties who see the relevance of NMM to
both pre-2020 and post-2020 climate regimes (Svenningsen,
2013). One reason is that the NMM would achieve a net decrease,
since not all emission reductions would be used to offset increased
emissions elsewhere, which may increase mitigation actions pre-
2020. Another reason is that the NMM could offer countries the
ability to use emission reductions outside their borders to achieve
their proposed targets. Therefore, the NMM may increase the
willingness of countries to raise their ambition level, as stated in
their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). In-
deed, some countries expressed their interest in using interna-
tional credits in their INDC (e.g. Switzerland, Mexico, Liechten-
stein, Canada, Morocco, South Korea, and so on) (Carbon Market
Watch, 2015). Besides, some countries have started pilots to fa-
cilitate the development of the modalities and procedures for the
NMM.
In spite of the slow progress in the global negotiations, the
discussions of scaling up existing project-based mechanisms to the
sectoral level and introducing sectoral approaches have been
continuing in academic circles (e.g. Baron et al., 2009; Schneider
and Cames, 2009; Schneider et al., 2014). Although the NMM may
contain project-level activities, the sectoral NMM is often the main
focus in the literature. This may result from the fact that sectoral
actions are an effective means for countries to implement emis-
sion reduction plans (Cai, 2013; IPCC, 2014). Hence, many coun-
tries are actually piloting NMM activities at sectoral level with the
aim to provide input into a potential NMM set-up and to get ready
for developing other policy instruments in the future.
The paper makes a three-fold contribution to the current dis-
cussions around the NMM. First, because of the many different
proposals of Parties and different pilot activities, there is a need to
deﬁne and unify the overall concept of the NMM at the interna-
tional level. In Section 2, we deﬁne the concept of the NMM, es-
tablish a framework to clarify the NMM and identify major options
for future implementation. Second, as the NMM is mainly pro-
posed at sectoral scale, the host country government – and not the
private sector – will be the major operator. This raises the question
of how host country governments can provide incentives to the
private sector, who are supposed to make the actual emission
reductions. The operational framework at the national level to
incentivize emission reductions of the private sector is thus key for
successful implementation. Based on a literature survey, Section 3
identiﬁes and evaluates different approaches and options regard-
ing the effectiveness and efﬁciency of such national frameworks.
Third, some developing and emerging countries – such as China,
Brazil and Bolivia – are cautious about the NMM and the inclusion
of other market mechanisms (UNFCCC, 2015b). Therefore, it is
important to clarify whether the NMM will bring beneﬁts to these
countries, discuss the challenges and difﬁculties that have to be
solved before the NMM is implemented, and explore how the
NMM can be implemented in order to function at different stages
of national development. Since the attitude of China – as the lar-
gest greenhouse gas emitter in the world – towards the NMM
would strongly inﬂuence the development and implementation of
the NMM globally, China is taken as a case for analyzing the po-
tential contributions and challenges of the NMM and its im-
plementation at different stages of national development. Finally,
the paper presents the conclusions and policy implications.2. New market mechanism and its major options
2.1. New market mechanism and its relationship with existingmarket-based instruments
The concept of the NMM can be clariﬁed in relation to existing
market-based mitigation instruments. Emission Trading System
(ETS) and carbon taxes are two independent market-based in-
struments that can internalize environmental externalities. A
carbon tax is levied on production activities or services that gen-
erate carbon emissions. The prices of such products or services
increase because of the tax, thereby reducing the demand for
them. An ETS sets a total amount of carbon emissions and allows
emission units to be traded at market prices. The new market
mechanism is classiﬁed as emission trading system. The emission
trading system involves two mechanisms. The ﬁrst one is a trading
mechanism, also known as cap-and-trade system, which is widely
applied globally (e.g. European Union, China, California). Another
one is the crediting mechanism, also known as baseline-and-credit
system, which is mainly used in the CDM and Joint Implementa-
tion (JI) under the Kyoto Protocol. As mentioned above, since the
proposals around the NMM are partly driven by the need for im-
proving the existing CDM, there is a strong relationship between
the CDM and the NMM. On the one hand, the purpose and func-
tion of the NMM are the same as the CDM, promoting the co-
operation among Parties and allowing Parties to use “international
transferred mitigation outcomes” to meet their reduction targets.
On the other hand, the NMM is “new” compared to the CDM in ﬁve
main ways: (i) it can be applied by all countries, and not only by
developing countries; (ii) the host country government has a more
important role, including initiating the NMM and facilitating
emission reductions; (iii) the NMM should go beyond the pure
offset mechanism (i.e. CDM) to achieve a net decrease by im-
plementing more ambitious policy or emission targets, discount-
ing at issuance, or shortening crediting periods (Wehnert et al.,
2013); (iv) the scope must be scaled up to broad segments of the
economy; (v) both the trading and crediting mechanisms can be
applied in the NMM.
To date, there has been no common understanding of what the
NMM should be like, while such a common understanding is
needed at the international level. Based on a comparative analysis
with the existing project-based CDM, diverse proposals of Parties
and current pilot activities, we explore the concept of the NMM.
According to Lehmann et al. (2014) and Article 6 of the Paris
agreement (UNFCCC, 2015a), the term new market mechanism is
considered as an umbrella concept for those emission trading
systems which all Parties can engage in on a voluntary basis in
order to achieve their intended nationally determined contribu-
tions, and which need to satisfy three criteria: (i) having a large
scale scope; (ii) aiming to facilitate net emission reductions; and
(iii) allowing ﬂexibility for the host country. In other words, the
NMM can be used to contribute to the reduction of emission levels
in the host Party, and, at the same time, the emission reductions
from the NMM can also be transferred through carbon market to
another Party to fulﬁll its INDC. The next part develops those
criteria into a framework to deﬁne the NMM at the international
level.
2.2. A framework to clarify NMM
Based on research of IGES (2013), we identify the key elements
of the NMM, as the basis to clarify the overall concept of the NMM
(see Fig. 1).
2.2.1. Governance
The governance of the NMM could either be centralized or
decentralized. Similar to the CDM and JI, a centrally governed
NMM would set and approve common rules, procedures and
methodologies that apply to all countries in the COP. In contrast,
Fig. 1. A framework to clarify NMM.
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minimum mandatory standards or set voluntary best practice
guidelines to provide more ﬂexibility for the host country
(UNFCCC, 2014a). Most Parties consider the NMM as a centralized
mechanism which would operate under the supervision of the
COP. However, some Parties (such as Japan) expect the NMM could
be built in a decentralized way to reﬂect individual national cir-
cumstances. Besides, current bilateral and multilateral pilots are
developed in the absence of internationally approved rules and
provisions. Therefore, both the centralized and decentralized op-
tions need to be incorporated at the current stage.
2.2.2. Scope
The idea that the NMM would have to be scaled up to ‘broad
segments of the economy’ is ambiguous and needs to be deﬁned
by the Parties. It is commonly understood that the NMMwill cover
mitigation activities at sectoral, sub-sectoral or cross-sectoral le-
vels (IGES, 2014). However, the term ‘sector’ is also ambiguous and
is open to various interpretations. A sector might cover an entire
sector, installations above a certain threshold, or installations in
speciﬁc regions (such as large cities). That is why ‘segments’ also
refers to ‘groups of emitters’ (Prag and Briner, 2012). Furthermore,
there is a wealth of experience and expertize with the CDM and JI,
as well as the great interest of some countries (e.g. China, Brazil),
to continue project-based market mechanisms. Therefore, a sim-
pliﬁed and improved CDM and JI could be consolidated into the
NMM, with ‘project’ and ‘program’ windows, as well as (sub-)
sectoral windows (UNFCCC, 2014a).
2.2.3. Method
Emission reductions can be achieved by concrete mitigation
measures of the private sector or the government promising to
achieve an agreed emission target based on aggregate sectoral
performance. The government can also use Nationally Appropriate
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) to mitigate emissions, which refer to
any policy and action that reduces emissions in developing
countries. The NAMAs currently proposed and planned are typi-
cally in the form of concrete policies and measures (PAMs), e.g.
energy efﬁciency standards, feed-in tariff policies, or removal of
environmentally harmful subsidies. These are similar to the con-
cept of ‘policy-based mitigation’ proposed by the World Bank
(UNFCCC, 2014b), which refers to emission reductions resulting
from the implementation of speciﬁc policies and measures.
2.2.4. Mechanism
The main difference between crediting and trading depends on
whether the units are issued ex-post or ex-ante and whether they
are non-binding or mandatory (Ecorys, 2012). Under a creditingmechanism, the issuance of credits is ex-post if the host country
successfully implements those PAMs, or achieves the agreed
emission targets. If the host country fails, there is no penalty due
to its non-binding nature. This is different for a trading mechanism
involving mandatory ex-ante issuance of tradable units. In this
case, the host country will receive tradable units according to the
agreed target of emissions in advance, for example start-up funds
for low carbon investments. If the target is overachieved, the host
country will get a surplus of units to be sold. If the target is not
met, the host country needs to buy units to cover the excess
emissions. A lot of literature and analysis on the NMM focuses on
the crediting mechanism, but whether such a trading mechanism
would be incorporated is uncertain and needs to be clariﬁed in
negotiations.
Under result-based ﬁnance (RBF), a funder commits to pay an
agreed amount for each ton of emission reduction to a project
implementer through a contract. This can be a powerful catalyst
for low-carbon investments by providing predictable funds,
especially given the current situation characterized as “lack of
demand”. That is why most current pilot activities are framed as
RBF. Although RBF is not a market mechanism per se, it could be a
bridge to crediting. There are two ways for it to link with carbon
markets (World Bank, 2013): (i) setting a price ﬂoor – the funder
guarantees price certainty while providing potentially higher
revenues than the market price by setting a price ﬂoor. If the
market price is lower than the price ﬂoor, the funder pays the
difference. Otherwise, the funder pays nothing and the released
funds can be re-invested in other projects; (ii) establishing a
tradable put option – the option allows the holder to sell an agreed
amount of emission reductions to the funder at a ﬁxed price on or
before a certain date. If the market price exceeds the ﬁxed price,
the holder sells the emission reductions into the market and the
option ends. Otherwise, the optionwill come into force. The option
could be transferable to effectively reduce non-delivery risks.
2.3. Major options of the NMM
According to the proposals of Parties and pilot activities, this
section sets out several major options of NMM that derive from
the wide range of studies, submissions of Parties and current pi-
lots. These options usually include a combination of the elements
from the framework above. Table 1 presents the options, key ele-
ments and leading advocates.
2.3.1. Enhanced CDM
Some countries in the negotiations, such as China, Brazil and
Environmental Integrity Group (Liechtenstein, Mexico, Monaco,
Korea and Switzerland), render great interest in continuing
Table 1
Major options for the NMM.
Governance Scope Method Mechanism Leading Advocate
Enhanced CDM
(CDMþ) Centralized Project/Program Mitigation measures Crediting Brazil (UNFCCC, 2014c)
NAMA crediting Centralized/
Decentralized
Subsector/ Sector/ NAMA Crediting Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Vietnam
(World Bank, 2015); Tunisia (GIZ, 2013)
Sectoral crediting mechan-
ism (SCM)
Centralized Subsector/Sector An emission target Crediting Morocco, Tunisia (World Bank, 2015);
European Union (UNFCCC, 2011)
Ecorys (Ecorys, 2012)
Sectoral trading mechan-
ism (STM)
Centralized Subsector/Sector An emission target Trading European Union (UNFCCC, 2011)
Ecorys (Ecorys, 2012)
Bilateral crediting
mechanism
Decentralized Project/ Mitigation
measures/
Japan (Le and Delbosc, 2012)
Program/ An emission target/ Crediting Warnecke and Fekete (2013)
Subsector/ NAMA
Sector
Project-based RBF Decentralized Project/Program Mitigation measures Price ﬂoor/Tradable put
option
World Bank (2013)
Sectoral RBF Decentralized Subsector/ Sector NAMA/An emission
target
Price ﬂoor/Tradable put
option
Indonesia, Latin America (Kfw, 2013a
and 2013b)
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that it is important to continue the experience and knowledge
accumulated by the project-based mechanisms over ten years.
Thus, enhanced CDM with necessary modiﬁcation in its mod-
alities, procedures and methodologies may be consolidated into
the NMM, with a continued focus on project and program level
activities.
2.3.2. NAMA crediting
Most current NMM pilots are typically in the form of NAMA
crediting at current stage. For example, Mexico plans to imple-
ment three sectoral NAMA crediting in urban communities, urban
transport and refrigeration respectively (World Bank, 2015). The
Tunisian Government has designed a NAMA crediting in the ce-
ment sector by introducing lower content of clinker, low-carbon
content fuels and wind power (GIZ, 2013). The issuance of credits
is linked with adoption, implementation and enforcement of PAMs
at sectoral or program level. Due to lack of data, most countries
use PAMs to reduce emissions to implement PAMs rather than
setting an emission target for a certain sector. Moreover, some
PAMs (such as feed-in tariffs) already exist and have been proven
to be effective. In the short term, therefore, strengthening an ex-
isting and successful policy can be an effective approach (Sterk
et al., 2014). However, emission reductions from some PAMs are
difﬁcult to measure, report and verify (MRV), which makes them
ineligible for crediting (Cai, 2010). In addition, the cost-effective-
ness of a NMM depends on the ﬂexibility for the private sector to
autonomously choose mitigation measures (Butzengeiger-Geyer
et al., 2010). Usually, speciﬁc measures and actions required to
achieve mitigation vary from company to company. If PAMs take
the form of taxes, the ﬂexibility for the private sector is high. But if
the PAMs, for example, take the form of introducing energy efﬁ-
cient refrigerators with low or zero GWP refrigerants (as in Mex-
ico), the ﬂexibility is low. Thus, the ﬂexibility of the private sector
offered by the PAMs is uncertain and depends on the speciﬁc
measures implemented by the government.
2.3.3. Sectoral market mechanism
A sectoral market mechanism (SMM), containing both sectoral
crediting and sectoral trading mechanisms, was initially proposed
by the European Union (EU). Unlike the crediting mechanism,
there is uncertainty about whether the sectoral trading mechan-
ism will be incorporated in the NMM. Some countries argue thatthe trading mechanism may increase the likelihood of overlap
between the NMM and a future global emissions trading system.
Besides, the binding nature of a trading mechanism may lead to a
weak target and thus have negative environmental effectiveness.
Moreover, while SMM is the focus in a major part of the literature
(e.g. Schneider and Cames, 2009; Ecorys, 2012; Cai et al., 2012;
Millard-Ball, 2013; Wang et al., 2015; Gao et al., 2016), it does not
seem to be the ﬁrst priority among current pilots. The reason, as
mentioned above, is that consistent and reliable data on emissions
is unavailable for setting an emission target in some countries. If
such a target could be set, however, it would offer high ﬂexibility
for the private sector and thus increase the cost-effectiveness of
the mechanism.
2.3.4. Bilateral crediting mechanism
The success of market mechanisms relies on a stable demand of
carbon units and a price that is high enough to stimulate emission
reduction investment. Using bilateral agreements in pilot activities
could be effective in light of the current demand scarcity. War-
necke and Fekete (2013) chose the electricity sector in Chile and
the building sector in South Africa to develop bilateral agreements
to pilot the sectoral market mechanisms. Japan has been im-
plementing its joint crediting mechanism (JCM) in eleven devel-
oping countries (e.g. Mongolia, Ethiopia and Vietnam). The Chi-
nese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has
also encouraged exploring bilateral and multilateral carbon trad-
ing activities in 2014–2020 (NDRC, 2014a).
2.3.5. Result-based ﬁnance (RBF) at both project and sectoral level
RBF is another way to solve the problem of demand scarcity.
Many pilots actually use the RBF to simulate market operation,
either at project or sectoral level. For example, a methane RBF
project pilot by the World Bank focuses on exploring cost-efﬁcient
methane mitigation of the private sector. Furthermore, European
Commission-supported programs in Indonesia and Latin America
design concepts and methods of RBF at the sectoral level. Both RBF
and bilateral crediting mechanism could be designed to ensure
environmental integrity with the perspective to be converted into
a centralized NMM.
3. Operational framework at the national level
The operational framework at the national level, which is one
Table 2
Different options of the operational framework at the national level.
Options Instruments Description and comparison
Tradable units for government Mandatory “sticks” Include general economic and ﬁscal policies, and standards
Voluntary “carrots” Include targeted economic and ﬁscal incentives, and in-
formation instrument
Tradable units for installations with volun-
tary targets
Government ensures each installation that achieves the
target to receive the tradable units
Low pressure of emission reductions for installation owner;
A low political feasibility from the host country
Retain a small portion of tradable units issued Low pressure of emission reductions for installation owner;
Unfair distribution of burden
Tradable units for installations with
mandatory targets
Pay tax for emissions exceeding the target High pressure of emission reductions for installation owner;
Akin to the carbon tax or energy tax and thus familiar for both
governments and private sectors
Buy tradable units for excess emissions High pressure of emission reductions for installation owner;
Applies to SMM and NAMA crediting;
Fluctuation of carbon price gives more freedom to installation
owners to make trading decisions
Pay a certain deposit for each ton of emissions ex-ante High pressure of emission reductions for installation owner;
Negative effect on the companies’ cash ﬂow and thus would
hardly offer incentives to participate
Domestic ETS High pressure of emission reductions for installation owner;
Applies to the SMM;
Ex-ante tradable units can be the parts of initial investment
Mixed policy instrument Both distribute tradable units to installations and in-
troduce concrete policy measures
High dynamic and static economic efﬁciency;
Potential policy interaction
S. Gao et al. / Energy Policy 98 (2016) 221–231 225of the six thematic areas in negotiations (SBSTA, 2013), determines
whether the NMM could actually generate emission reductions. It
also receives most attentions from workshops on the NMM
(NEFCO and Kfw, 2013). Since there has been much experience
with project-based mechanisms, this section is limited to the
sectoral level. Because the private sector cannot be in charge of a
whole sector, the NMM at the sectoral level is clearly different
from project-based mechanisms. The host country government
will have to be in the driving seat instead of the private sector. This
raises a key issue: how can the government develop an appro-
priate operational framework at the national level to stimulate the
private sector to reduce emissions in order to achieve the emission
targets or PAMs? To unpack this question, we look at whether the
tradable units from crediting should be disbursed to individual
emitters or retained by the government. Three options are pro-
posed: (i) tradable units for government; (ii) tradable units for
installations; (iii) a mixed policy instrument. Table 2 presents
these different options of the operational framework at the na-
tional level, which are developed in more detail in the remainder
of this section.
3.1. Tradable units for the government
This option is based on a strong executive force of the gov-
ernment to implement mitigation policies across sectors or sub-
sectors. The government could introduce a variety of PAMs and use
the potential tradable unit revenues or RBF funds to support policy
implementation. There are two options (Harrison et al., 2011):
(i) mandatory “sticks” containing general economic and ﬁscal po-
licies (e.g. energy/carbon tax and abolishment of fossil fuel sub-
sidies), and standards (e.g. efﬁciency standards for electric vehicles
and building codes); and (ii) voluntary “carrots” consisting of in-
formation instruments (e.g. know-how transfer and demonstra-
tion and training), and targeted economic and ﬁscal incentives
(e.g. government procurement and feed-in tariffs). The govern-
ment usually uses policy packages that include both sticks and
carrots.
Tradable units for the government are relatively easy to im-
plement as the accounting of emissions takes place on a sectoralscale and there is no need for installation level emission data. It is
thus suitable for sectors with numerous emission sources, and for
state-owned sectors in particular. There is a broad range of miti-
gation policies to ﬁt into the speciﬁc sector. Besides, some policies
(e.g. feed-in tariffs) have been already in place and these can be
strengthened and up-scaled through the NMM. In terms of eco-
nomic efﬁciency, this option provides high dynamic efﬁciency as it
can foster the development of technologies which are currently
commercially less attractive (e.g. carbon capture and storage), or
are hard to incentivize by the current carbon price (Sterk et al.,
2014). However, emission reductions from some PAMs are difﬁcult
to account or needs prohibitively high MRV costs, inducing a risk
of ineligibility for crediting. Moreover, as mentioned above, the
ﬂexibility provided by PAMs for the private sector to choose mi-
tigation measures might be small (e.g. abolishment of outdated
equipment), which could have a negative effect on the cost-ef-
fectiveness of the mechanism in the long run.
3.2. Tradable units for installations
This option requires a lot of installation-level emissions data as
a basis for passing the sectoral target and PAMs to installations.
Each installation will be allocated its own target, using either vo-
luntary or mandatory measures, which will be discussed below.
3.2.1. Voluntary target
A voluntary target, without penalties for non-performance,
may cause some installations to achieve their targets while others
do not. Therefore, a sector as a whole might not achieve the target
and not get enough tradable units. This problem could be an ob-
stacle for individual installation to actively invest in emission re-
ductions. Two options can be used to solve this problem: (i) the
government could ensure each installation that achieves the target
to receive the tradable units (Dransfeld et al., 2011); or (ii) the
government retains a small portion of tradable units issued as a
buffer to be reinvested into buying the shortfall tradable units
(IETA, 2010). If the buffer is insufﬁcient, the government will cover
the rest.
Voluntary targets put less pressure on each installation owner
(S. Gao et al. / Energy Policy 98 (2016) 221–231226to reduce emissions which may have inﬂuence on the competi-
tiveness of installations. However, the ﬁrst option exposes the
government to the risk of taking on the costs from the installations
that fail to achieve their target, and thus lowers the political fea-
sibility. The second option induces unfair situations where the
installations that have successfully reduced their emissions have
to pay for the costs of the installations that fail to achieve their
targets.
3.2.2. Mandatory target
A mandatory target with penalties would be an effective ap-
proach to solve the above mentioned problems induced by a vo-
luntary target, but will cause more pressure on installation own-
ers. Four options can be used to work with mandatory targets.
(i) If the target is achieved, the installation receives the tradable
units. If not, the government will levy a tax on the emissions
exceeding the target (Butzengeiger et al., 2012). The tax rate
could be set at the recent average carbon price under SMM
and NAMA crediting mechanism, or, depending on the pre-
vailing market price, under RBF. This option is akin to the
current carbon tax or energy tax in some countries.
(ii) If installations fail to achieve the target, they are obliged to buy
tradable units from carbon markets for the excess emissions
and hand them over to the government (Whitesell, 2009). This
option only applies to SMM and NAMA crediting. Compared
with the emission tax, the ﬂuctuating carbon price gives
installations more ﬂexibility to make trading decisions.
iii) The government charges installation owners a certain ex-ante
deposit for each ton of emissions, which will be returned if the
target is achieved. If not, there is no return (Michaelowa,
2012). This option has worked well in the context of waste
management (Walls, 2011), but does require trusts in the
government to provide the future refund. Any unclaimed
deposits could be used to offset excess emissions. The deposits
could be invested in government bonds and accrued interests
could be paid to the owners so as to make it equivalent to an
investment of owners themselves. The interests, however, may
be lower than that of other investment made by owners.
Moreover, ex-ante deposits will negatively impact the cash
ﬂow of the private sector and would thus offer less incentive
to participate.
(iv) The government establishes a domestic emission trading sys-
tem that is only applicable to the SMM (Schneider and Cames,
2009). The operation of this option is similar to the current
regional emission trading system (e.g. EU ETS, California cap-
and-trade Program and the upcoming China national ETS). Ex-
ante tradable units would mean that trading will be conductedTable 3
Summary assessment of the above three options.
Options Pros
Tradable units for
government
Relatively easy to implement;
Suitable for sectors with numerous emission sources,
owned sectors;
A broad range of mitigation policies to ﬁt into the spe
Some policies have been already in place;
High dynamic efﬁciency.
Tradable units for
installations
High static efﬁciency;
High ﬂexibility for the private sector;
Promotes the private sector to establish an advanced e
agement system and to increase carbon trading and m
Mixed policy instrument Both high dynamic and static economic efﬁciencyat the beginning and that the income from selling tradable
units can be part of initial investments. Notably, the crediting
mechanism would need to establish a separate national
emission currency (tradable units) for this ex-ante distribu-
tion. The national emission currency could also be allowed to
be exchanged against the future credits issued by COP.
The option of distributing tradable units to installations re-
quires accounting emissions at the installation level, which would
increase the administrative and technical efforts. The private sec-
tor is directly exposed to the carbon market and its price. This
means that an advanced energy and emission management system
should be in place, as well as sufﬁcient carbon trading and man-
agement capacity in the private sector. The carbon price signal can
effectively stimulate emission reductions in the short run, which
may provide a high static efﬁciency. The private sector, however,
would have to make investment decisions based on the price
signal only. This would hinder the development of expensive
technologies with bright prospects in the long run and thus may
lead to a lower dynamic efﬁciency. The option does offer high
ﬂexibility by making the private sector select their own measures
and thus provide high cost-effectiveness.
3.3. Mixed policy instrument
A mixed-policy instrument combines the above two options,
both distributing tradable units to installations and introducing
concrete policy measures (Ecorys, 2012; Harrison et al., 2011). This
combination could provide both high dynamic and static economic
efﬁciency. The example is the EU which implements an ETS while
also having various sector and technology policies in place. This
design, however, faces the challenge of policy interaction that
potentially causes confusion and reduces effectiveness. According
to De Perthuis and Trotignon (2014), undesirable overlap with
other public policies is one of the most important factors under-
mining the EU ETS. Flues et al. (2014) also study the interaction
between renewable energy policies in EU and its ETS under the
different scenarios of electricity demand. Their results show that
the renewable energy support policies make the price of tradable
units of the EU ETS more sensitive to changes in economic activ-
ities, and that these consequences of policy interactions become
more serious when the electricity demand is lower. Table 3 pre-
sents the summary assessment of the above three options.4. New market mechanisms in China
Some developing and emerging countries present a cautiousCons
Emission reductions are difﬁcult to measure or costs
of MRV are prohibitively high;particularly for state-
ciﬁc sector; Flexibility for the private sector might be small;
Low static efﬁciency;
Negative effect on the cost-effectiveness of the me-
chanism in the long run.
Requires accounting of emissions at the installation
level;
Higher administrative and technical efforts;
nergy and emission man-
anagement capacity.
Low dynamic efﬁciency.
Potential policy interaction
(S. Gao et al. / Energy Policy 98 (2016) 221–231 227attitude towards the NMM as they fear it might become a major
obstacle for its development. It is therefore important to analyze
whether and what kind of beneﬁts the NMM will bring and how
the NMM is to be implemented at different stages of a country's
development. As the biggest emerging economy and largest
greenhouse gas emitter, the position of China towards the NMM
could have a major effect on the future of the NMM in negotia-
tions. Moreover, China has been expressing some interest in the
NMM, for example through its ongoing policy experiments with
carbon markets on provincial and municipal level and its plan to
implement a national ETS in 2017. It is therefore timely to analyze
the development of the NMM in China. Notwithstanding, the in-
sights of this article are also relevant for other developing and
emerging countries investigating the feasibility of the NMM, such
as Mexico and Peru. This section ﬁrst explores potential con-
tributions of the NMM in China. Subsequently it discusses how to
choose the appropriate options of the NMM and design the op-
erational framework at the national level. Finally, some of the
main implementation challenges are laid out.
4.1. Contributions of the NMM in China
4.1.1. Provide climate ﬁnance and further emission reductions
The recent target for CO2 emissions to peak around 2030 in
China requires substantial climate ﬁnance and emission reduc-
tions. Although China has spent $87.6 billion each year during
2008–2012, there will be $370 billion shortfall in 2030 in order to
achieve the low carbon transformation (Amin et al., 2014). To
cover this huge funding gap the key issue is to leverage more
private investment through public funds and carbon markets,
which could be attained through an NMM. Given the current un-
certainty about carbon markets, RBF and bilateral crediting me-
chanism with predictable payments could be good choices. The
potential of RBF for climate ﬁnance has been explored since the
Warsaw COP 19, where the Green Climate Fund was set up to
collectively channel adequate and predictable results-based cli-
mate ﬁnance (UNFCCC, 2013). The World Bank is also developing a
piloting fund that supports up-scaled crediting programs in de-
veloping countries through offering payments for carbon credits
(World Bank, 2015). The Chinese government also has expressed
interest to establish bilateral and multiple carbon trading activities
during the period of 2014–2020 (NDRC, 2014a).
Deepening and broadening mitigation actions is required in
view of ambitious climate change mitigation target in China. China
is planning to establish a national ETS in 2017, which caps the
emissions of the power and energy intensive industries. Although
non-ETS sectors, such as the transport and building sectors, cur-
rently represent a relatively small share of emissions, they could
be major contributors of future emission growth. Controlling
emissions of the transport and building sector will also be one of
the major measures to achieve the INDC of China (NDRC, 2015a).
The NMM at sectoral level could, if properly designed, play a sig-
niﬁcant role. In the road transport sector, one of the principle
abatement options is the development of electric vehicles (EV)
(McKinsey, 2009), although the ambition to establish a large EV
industry is not realized as fast as the government expected. One of
the reasons is that most battery companies adopt a ‘wait and see’
attitude, because of market uncertainty and difﬁculties to access
government subsidies (Wan et al., 2015). There is also a serious
lack of ﬁnancial incentives to stimulate new energy efﬁcient
technology and product investment in the building sector (Zhang
andWang, 2013). If the government could use the NMM to provide
more subsidies and provide speciﬁc policy signals, investments of
the private sector would be stimulated and more emission re-
ductions could be achieved. In addition, there is a wide range of
low-cost methane abatement opportunities in the oil and gassector, solid waste management, wastewater treatment, and the
livestock waste sector. These could be encouraged through incre-
mental funds, such as the RBF (World Bank, 2013). The NMM could
therefore overcome some of these ﬁnancial constraints in these
sectors and stimulate further emission reductions.
4.1.2. Create readiness for other climate policies
Given that there is much uncertainty about whether NMM
materializes as expected in negotiations, it is important to discuss
the relevance of the NMM in relation to other climate policies. As
mentioned, the Chinese government is planning a national ETS in
2017 and has expressed its interests to introduce a carbon tax in the
future. The national ETS would cap emissions from power, me-
tallurgy and building materials sector and gradually expand to other
sectors (NDRC, 2015b). Therefore, if NMM activities in current non-
ETS sectors could create readiness for an easy transition into the
national ETS and even into a carbon tax in the future, they would
not go to waste. The World Bank (2015) has already identiﬁed the
relevance of crediting-related activities to the other policies. Based
on these points, we consider four NMM activities that are relevant
to the development of a national ETS and carbon tax in China.
(i) Data management and MRV system: This activity is necessary
for almost all climate policies, but its transferability depends
on speciﬁc operational frameworks at the national level. If no
targets are issued to installations, emissions would be ac-
counted at the aggregate sectoral level based on statistical
data (e.g. fuel statistics), which is less likely to be used in the
ETS or carbon tax systems. If each installation gets a target,
installation level data is needed, which is highly transferrable
into the ETS and carbon tax systems. In fact, this activity has
already taken place in China to prepare for the national ETS
(NDRC, 2014b).
(ii) Quantiﬁcation approaches: This activity refers to methodolo-
gies that are used to set a target and quantify emissions. The
development of a target for non-ETS sectors in China under
the NMM would increase the understanding of mitigation
potential and cost while supporting cap-setting in the context
of the national ETS. However, the contribution of this activity
to the ETS depends upon different options within the NMM.
For example, under a NAMA crediting mechanism, the target
takes the form of successful achievement of a speciﬁc policy
(such as an energy efﬁciency standard). This kind of target has
little applicability for caps-setting under the ETS. However,
under a sectoral crediting mechanism, the target takes the
form of an emission target at the sectoral level, which could
easily be used in the ETS.
iii) Registry system: This activity is essential for an ETS and its
function under the NMM could be adapted to manage differ-
ent tradable units. Seven emission trading pilots in China are
developing their registry systems currently, collecting im-
portant experiences and lessons to overcome some of the
main challenges. Other regions could also establish such a
system within the context of the NMM to provide valuable
inputs into the national ETS.
(iv) Stakeholder engagement: This activity includes training,
workshops and outreach for relevant stakeholders, such as the
private sector, certain government departments and veriﬁers,
which could strengthen their awareness and capacity of par-
ticipation in market-based instruments. Therefore, the re-
levant skills would be used to set the stage for the national ETS
and carbon tax systems in China.
4.1.3. First-mover advantages
In addition to ﬁtting into the national development needs, pi-
loting the NMM would provide China with ﬁrst-mover advantages
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this mechanism are still pending and national pilots could feed
into international negotiations processes. Examples from the past
have shown that early actions have a positive effect on the de-
velopment of market-based mechanism and have the priority to
set standards (Warnecke and Fekete, 2013; Höhne et al., 2015).
This is part of the reason why many developing and emerging
countries are entering into a pilot phase (e.g. Mexico, Peru and
Tunisia). The Chinese government would also be wise to explore
NMM pilots that are suitable for its national priorities, to add their
own views to the discussion, and to take a leading role in setting
modalities and procedures of the NMM.
4.1.4. Overcome non-price barriers
While large ﬁnancially viable abatement potential exists, this
has not been fully developed in some sectors of China. The ex-
istence of economically proﬁtable abatement potential suggests
that there are some non-price barriers or hidden costs. For ex-
ample, technologies of Electric arc furnace in China's iron and steel
sector are almost all cost-effective while its share in China is only
10% (less than most developed countries) because of the shortage
of scrap and electricity (Li and Zhu, 2014). Similarly, at least 11
emission reduction technologies in China's cement sector are cost-
effective, yet most of them have a low rate of adoption (Gu et al.,
2012). One reason is the shortage of alternative fuel and limited
transportation network for recycling alternative fuel. In addition,
the dominance of state-owned companies in China may limit the
ability of companies to make commercial choices and react to the
market incentives. The NMM, as a price-based mechanism, could
help to overcome such non-price barriers by providing ﬁnancial
beneﬁts (Sterk et al., 2014). However, only ﬁnancial beneﬁts from
the NMM might not be enough to effectively address these bar-
riers. However, only ﬁnancial beneﬁts from the NMMmight not be
enough to effectively address these barriers. The government also
needs to implement dedicated policy instruments (Gupta et
al.,2007). Therefore, the revenue of tradable units under the NMM
would offer the ﬁnancial support for developing such policies.
Among the major options of the NMM, the sectoral trading me-
chanism might be the most useful one for China since the tradable
units are issued ex-ante, which could help to fund the removal of
non-price barriers beforehand.
4.2. Challenges of the NMM in China
4.2.1. Data reliability
The reliability and consistency of data from installations de-
termines whether the NMM could be implemented successfully. At
the current stage, the quality and quantity of emission data in
China tend to be poor (Munnings et al., 2016). For example, there
is a 1.4-gigaton gap between the national and provincial statistics
in 2010 (Guan et al., 2012) and similar discrepancies between
bottom-up and top-down datasets (Liu and Nan, 2012). One reason
is that the government lacks experience in collecting emission
data (Wang, 2013a). Another reason is the light punishment for
obstruction of inspection and falsiﬁcation of data (Wang, 2013b).
In addition, the methods for accounting emissions among emis-
sion trading pilots are different, which makes it difﬁcult to obtain
consistent emission data for speciﬁc sectors. Therefore, an effec-
tive monitoring, reporting, and veriﬁcation (MRV) system is nee-
ded, including strengthening stakeholder engagement in MRV
design, as well as trainings for personnel from the companies and
veriﬁers (World Bank, 2014a). Besides, it is also necessary to carry
out targeted and detailed sector-speciﬁc studies before NMM im-
plementation. The Chinese government is making steps to im-
prove the MRV system and improve the quality of emission data.
For example, the greenhouse gas emission accounting guidance for14 sectors has been released, and a national accounting system
will be established (NDRC, 2014b).
4.2.2. Policy interaction
Currently, there are many regulations to manage energy use in
China, some of which include detailed targets at national and
provincial level and impose speciﬁc requirements on local gov-
ernments and companies. In addition, there is a wide range of
sectoral measures on energy efﬁciency and low carbon technolo-
gies, as well as the upcoming national ETS and carbon tax. All
these policies would interact with the NMM. This interaction
would make the measurement and projection of emissions parti-
cularly difﬁcult in China (Munnings et al., 2016). As a result, some
overlapping climate policies may achieve the emission reductions
that an ETS should achieve (Zhang et al., 2013). In addition, these
energy and climate policies are developed by different ministries
and agencies, which results in overlap, inconsistency and confu-
sion and thus reduce the effectiveness (Zhang et al., 2014). In this
context, how to coordinate the NMM with these existing and
upcoming policies is critical for implementing a well-functioning
NMM in China. Therefore, the government has to address its
compatibility with other polices and to coordinate these policies
across multiple agencies.
4.2.3. Legal barriers
For the NMM to succeed in generating emission reductions, the
host country government needs to develop an appropriate op-
erational framework at the national level that can incentivize the
private sector to reduce emissions. As mentioned in Section 3.2,
the government may set mandatory targets for installations. In
order to ensure compliance, a legal framework needs to be es-
tablished, allowing the government to impose a noncompliance
fee. In most emission trading systems, the noncompliance fee
equals a multiple of the tradable unit price for each ton of CO2,
with no limit on the total fee amount. However, the legal frame-
work for noncompliance is still weak in China. Only two en-
vironmental laws at the national level refer to noncompliance fees
and were set many years ago. One is a one-time fee for non-
compliance with environmental laws in the China's Environmental
Protection Law (NPC, 1989). Another one is the Law of the People's
Republic of China limiting any noncompliance fee to roughly
100,000 yuan. Moreover, this law does not include CO2 as a pol-
lutant (NPC, 2000). Even though such noncompliance fees could
be applied to the CO2, the limited penalty level would not provide
a strong deterrent against noncompliance (Zhang et al., 2014).
While the upper limit of noncompliance fees has been removed
under the recently amended law (NPC, 2014), it is still unclear
whether the new law extends to CO2. Therefore, a clear and in-
tegrated law framework at the national level is required for the
successful implementation of the NMM in China.
4.2.4. State-owned companies
The existence of state-owned companies in China poses both
opportunities and challenges for emission trading systems such as
the NMM. In the current emission trading pilots, most state-
owned companies perform well (Zhang, 2014). These state-owned
companies usually have strong sources of funding and a high ca-
pacity to implement emission reduction projects, thus providing
good opportunities for the NMM. The challenge lies in China's
unique political economy. Although the government no longer
directly operates the state-owned companies, it still continues to
appoint and evaluate top managers. Most of state-owned compa-
nies are large and thus have signiﬁcant market power, which could
result in inefﬁcient market outcomes, as these companies can hold
a large number of tradable units to manipulate the price (Qi et al.,
2014). This situation is likely to occur when the government
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tional level. Thus, the government needs to anticipate this situa-
tion and take action to avoid it, for example by limiting the
amount of tradable units a company can hold.
4.3. Implementation of the new market mechanism in Chin
A key issue for the NMM in China will be its implementation at
different stages of development. At the current stage, as noted
above, strengthening existing and successful policies in non-ETS
sectors would be considered an effective way and a good starting
point. For example, the government requires the full im-
plementation of 50% reduction in heating energy for buildings
without proper insulation by 2020, which will save 31.5 million
t-CO2 in 2020 (MOHURD, 2011). If this strategy would include all
the new buildings to aim for a standard of 65% reduction, up to
64.0 million t-CO2 would be realized by 2030 (Xiao et al., 2014). In
view of the current supply and demand imbalance of tradable
units in the international carbon market, a sectoral RBF and bi-
lateral crediting mechanism would be most appropriate. Because
of the lack of installation level data at present, the government
could retain the tradable units and use their revenues to co-fund
the costs related to the policies outlined above.
The NDRC has already ordered the 20,000 biggest companies to
report their annual greenhouse gas emissions, aiming to establish
a national accounting system (NDRC, 2014b). Some of the pro-
vinces and cities (e.g. Shanghai and Anhui) have already started
reporting their greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, more in-
stallation level data will be available in the next few years and
setting an emission target for an entire sector or even for in-
dividual installations would thus become feasible. A mandatory
target for installations could be an effective way to create a fair
system, as mentioned above. Such mandatory targets are already
common for the government to reduce emissions in China, for
instance in the top-1000 energy-consuming enterprises program
(NDRC, 2006).
With the development of the NMM in non-ETS sectors, the
possible relationship with national ETS should be explored. There
are two conceivable pathways. The NMM in non-ETS sectors could
serve as a stepping stone to a future national ETS by creating
readiness in these sectors for a gradual transition into the national
ETS. On the other hand, not all sectors will be involved in the
national ETS and the NMM in those sectors could be considered as
an independent and complementary mitigation tool to theFig. 2. Possible process of implemnational ETS.
Once there is enough demand for tradable units, the sectoral
market mechanism including sectoral crediting or even sectoral
trading would become major options of the NMM. In this case,
tradable units directly from UNFCCC could be used for compliance
or traded without any approval process at the international level.
One of the possible pathways is thus that national ETS becomes
integrated into the sectoral market mechanism as an option for the
operational framework at the national level. Alternatively, the
sectoral market mechanism could remain independent from the
national ETS. Fig. 2 shows the possible process of implementing
the NMM in China.5. Conclusion and policy implications
In this paper, we established a framework to shed light on the
ambiguity of the NMM concept, which needs to be speciﬁed at the
international level. We also presented different options of the
national-level operational framework of the NMM and assessed
them with respect to effectiveness and efﬁciency. Finally, China
was analyzed as a case to explore the contributions and challenges
that the NMM could bring and how the NMM could be im-
plemented at different stages of a country's development. This
shows that the NMM could be a useful mitigation instrument for
developing and emerging countries if designed properly.
In order to exploit the beneﬁts of the NMM in these countries,
it is important to take national capacities, priority sectors and the
future climate change mitigation policy and strategy into account.
First, countries could choose the sector which accounts for a
considerable and increasing share of national emissions, has the
relevant experience on market instruments (e.g. CDM), and is able
to contribute to future mitigation policy development. For ex-
ample, China could explore the NMM in the transport and building
sectors which are considered as priority areas to achieve the INDC
of China. Vietnam has set a target in the solid waste sector for
NAMA crediting because this sector has experience with the CDM
and relevant data is available (NRES and MPI, 2012).
Second, if the primary target of a developing country is to get
more climate ﬁnance and leverage more low-carbon investment of
the private sector, strengthening existing mitigation policies could
be a good choice. Because of political feasibility and the absence of
need for reliable data on emissions from installations, this could
prompt a quick start. If a developing country also plans to use theenting the NMM in China.
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ETS or carbon tax system, it could set an emission target for a
speciﬁc sector and forward the sectoral target to installations. This
could help to build a reliable emission database, increase the un-
derstanding of mitigation potential and cost, and establish re-
levant institutions. For example, China could use the NMM in non-
ETS sectors to create readiness and gradually transition into a
national ETS, as noted above. Thailand and Peru are exploring the
NMM, and the market institutions and capacities built in the NMM
could serve as a stepping stone to establish a domestic ETS there
too (World Bank, 2015). Similarly, this pathway could apply to
other countries that are considering to launch an ETS or carbon tax
system, such as Chile and Brazil (World Bank, 2014b).
Third, given the current demand scarcity for tradable units,
bilateral crediting mechanisms or RBF could be good choices,
which could evolve into a NAMA crediting or a sectoral market
mechanism once there is adequate demand for tradable units. Fi-
nally, in addition to satisfy the national development needs, it is
worth noting that early action on the NMM would give developing
and emerging countries the opportunity to set standards on the
NMM in negotiations, which are currently dominated by devel-
oped countries.
However, challenges and difﬁculties in establishing the NMM
remain and need to be solved, including data reliability, policy
interaction, legal barriers, and how to deal with state-owned
companies. A reliable and consistent MRV, targeted and detailed
sector-speciﬁc analysis, a clear and integrated law framework at
the national level, and an effective mechanism to coordinate the
NMM with the existing and upcoming policies are required before
the NMM can be implemented. In addition, Chinese government
needs to pay attention to the possible market distortions caused
by the large state-owned companies.Acknowledgments
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